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Editor's Note: The empirical study 
described in this article was funded by a 
grant from the ABI Endowment Fund. 
The mandatory appointment of a credi-
tors' committee was intended to provide 
dynamic tension with the debtor that 
would stimulate the reorganization pro-
cess through effective and efficient over-
sight and negotiation. 
-Harvey R. Millerl D ynamic tension is often used to connote two or more conflicting 
priorities that may influence deci-
sion-making. In the business-restructur-
ing context, it has been used to describe 
the relationship among debtors and their 
various stakeholders, including secured 
creditors, unsecured creditors and share-
holders.2 Each party potentially has a 
unique and competing agenda regarding 
the debtor's restructuring plan. Although 
competing agendas can lead to conflict, 
this can also encourage parties to reevalu-
ate alternatives and explore different or 
innovative ways to create value. 
This potentially productive role 
of dynamic tension in restructuring 
1 "The Changing Face of Chapter 11 : A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy 
Judge as Producer, Director and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization 
Passion Play," 69 Am, Bankr, L. J. 431 , 449 (1995). 
2 See, e.g., Thomas C. Given and Linda J. Philipps, "Equality in the Eye 
of the Beholder-Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 
11 Reorganizations," 43 Ohio St. L. J. 735, 735-36 (1982) (explain-
ing "dynamic tension " in context of reorganization vs. liquidation 
restructuring options); Donald R. Korobkin, "Bankruptcy Law, Ritual 
and Performance," 103 Colum. L. Rev. 2124, 2130 (2003) (explaining 
that resutts under bankruptcy laws often "spontaneously emerge ... at a 
juncture of futility and loss, from the dynamic and generative tension 
of normative directives in unavoidable conftict"); see also Miller, supra, 
n.1, at 449; James E. Spiotto, "Overview of the Workout Process," The 
Problems of Indenture Trustees and Bondholders, 731, 739 (PLI Real 
Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. N4--4591 , 1995) ("Any 
discussion of marshalling of assets would be incomplete without discuss-
ing the dynamic tension between unsecured and secured creditors."). 
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negotiations argu-
ably underlies the 
committee structure 
incorporated into 
the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code.3 In fact, the 
legislative history 
of § 1102 of the 
Code suggests that 
Congress antici-
pated a multiple-
Cover Feature 
committee structure in many cases. 4 
Nevertheless, this structure has not 
emerged as a dominant or even pre-
ferred option, given, among other 
things, concerns regarding costs, effi-
ciency and stakeholder interest in serv-
ing on committees . 
The committee structure, whether 
composed of one or multiple commit-
tees, is a core principle of chapter 11. The 
committee oversees the debtor's conduct 
during the case, investigates the debtor's 
conduct prior to the case and advocates 
the interests of the stakeholder group 
3 See Miller, supra, n.1, at 449-50. 
4 The legislative history provides, in relevant part: 
There will be at least one committee in each case. Because 
unsecured creditors are normally the largest body of credi-
tors and most in need of representation, the bill requires that 
there be a committee of unsecured creditors ... the bill also 
provides for additional committees, with status equal to that 
of the unsecured creditors' committee, when such additional 
committees are needed to represent various other interests in 
this case, including secured creditors, subordinated creditors, 
and equity security holders. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 235-36 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
represented by the committee.5 In many 
respects, the committee provides several 
of the key monitoring functions previous-
ly performed by independent trustees and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 
under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. 
"[A] creditors' committee 'is not a per-
functory or useless body, simply appoint-
ed to satisfy a formality established by 
the Bankruptcy Code, but rather should 
be a vital and integral part of the plan for-
mulation process. '''6 
Despite the importance of the com-
mittee structure, relatively little empiri-
cal work regarding the role and objec-
tives served by the structure exists . 
Accordingly, this empirical study was 
designed to fill this void and shed light 
on the workings of committees in chapter 
11 cases. We are grateful for the funding 
to conduct this study provided by a grant 
from the ABI Endowment Fund. We also 
recei ved significant support and assistance 
from The Bureau of Sociological Research 
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
The study'S primary data and analy-
ses are presented in a forthcoming article 
for the Vanderbilt Law Review (herein 
referred to as "Committee Capture"),7 in 
which we detail our methodology and the 
components of our database, explain the 
limitations of the study and then provide 
5 See, e.g., InreABCAuto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437, 441 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1997) ("The function of the committee is to represent and protect 
the interests of the unsecured creditors in the plan negotiation process 
and throughout the entire bankruptcy case."); In re Diversified Capital 
Corp. , 89 B.R. 826, 829 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) ("The purpose of a 
committee of unsecured creditors is to monitor the operations and 
activities of the debtor and its compliance with the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code."). 
6 Miller, supra, n.1, at 449-50 (c~ing Retail Mktg. Co v. Nw. Nat'l Bank (In 
reMakolnc.), 120 B.R. 203, 212 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990)). 
7 Michelle M. Harner and Jamie Marincic, "Committee Capture? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors ' Committees in Business 
Reorganizations," 64 Vand. L. Rev., http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstractjd= 1679986. 
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a thorough analysis of the data. 8 This 
article summarizes certain of the key 
data analyses and interesting descrip-
tive data included in the study, and the 
"Committee Capture" article should be 
consulted for a complete understanding 
of the study and its implications. 
Overview of the Study 
We created the study's case data-
base by systematically coding the court 
dockets of 296 chapter 11 cases. The 
database contains information on 129 
primary variables (e.g., filing date, num-
ber of committee members, whether 
plan was filed, whether sale was pur-
sued, ultimate case resolution). The 
cases, filed between Jan. 1,2002, and 
Dec. 31 , 2008, were selected from six 
jurisdictions using a stratified random 
sample.9 All but 12 ofthe sampled cases 
had some definitive indication of case 
outcome at the end of the data-collec-
tion period. 10 
Recognizing that the case database 
reflected only public information dis-
closed by parties in documents filed on 
the docket, we supplemented the case 
component of the study with a survey of 
300 professionals who work on chapter 
11 cases and 300 individuals who have 
served on creditors' committees in those 
cases. The survey collected information 
about committee activities in chapter 11 
cases-relations among committees, the 
debtor and other parties in the case-
and the influence of and conflicts among 
committee members and professionals. 
Acceptable response rates were received 
on both surveys.ll Some of the survey 
data has been summarized in this article, 
but a more complete report is forthcom-
ing in a symposium issue of the Seattle 
Law Review.12 
The overwhelming majority of cases 
in the database involved business debt-
ors organized as corporations . Based 
on the debtors' schedules of assets 
and liabilities, the median amount of 
See id. (manuscript at 17-20, 34-35). 
We used the District of Delaware, Northern District of Illinois and 
Southern District of New York as primary jurisdictions, and the Central 
District of California, District of Maryland and Northern District of Ohio 
as add~ional jurisdictions. The use of and justifications for selecting 
these jurisdictions are explained fully in "Committee Capture." See 
Harner and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 17-20). 
10 For most cases in the database, we collected data from the petition 
date through and including the ea~ier of the closing of the case and 
June 30, 2009. For cases unresolved as of June 30, 2009, we per-
formed additional data collection through and including June 30, 2010. 
See Hamer and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 17-20). 
11 There were 251 professionals and 213 committee members that 
were contacted and met eligibility criteria. Ultimately, 70 profes-
sionals (28 percent) and 43 committee members (20 percent) com-
pleted the survey. 
12 The survey data and analyses are being presented at the Annual Ado" 
A. Berle, Jr. Center of Corporations, Law and Society Symposium 
and was published in the corresponding symposium issue of the 
Seattle Law Review, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers. 
cfm?abstractjd=1736024. 
assets was $2,508,000 and the median 
amount of liabilities was $6,156,700Y 
Approximately 66 percent of the cases 
involved between 1-199 creditors, with 
the remaining cases involving 200 or 
more creditors.14 As explained more fully 
in "Committee Capture," "143 cases 
(48.3 percent) involved at least one cred-
itors' committee and 153 cases (51.7 per-
cent) involved no creditors' committees. 
Of the cases with creditors' committees, 
95.8 percent had one creditors' commit-
tee, 2.1 percent had two creditors' com-
mittees and 2.1 percent had three credi-
tors' committees.,,15 
Analysis of the Case Database 
Based on anecdotal evidence and the 
legislative history of § 1102, we formu-
lated two hypotheses to test in the study. 
In the first hypothesis, "creditors' com-
13 See Harner and Marincic, supra, n.7 (rnanuscript at 21). 
14 See id. (rnanuscript at 22). 
15 Id. (rnanuscript at 23) (footnote ornitted) (as of Dec. 7, 2010). "Overall, 
152 cases (51.4 percent) involved some type of committee (i.e., 
creditors' committee, equity committee, ad hoc committee or some 
combination), leaving 144 cases (48.6 percent) with no committee 
involvemen\." Id.; see also chart 1. 
mittees add value to Chapter 11 cases, 
as determined by returns to unsecured 
creditors and company reorganiza-
tions.,,'6 In the second hypothesis, "the 
presence or absence of conflict or self-
interest in the composition of creditors' 
committees impacts value in Chapter 11 
cases, as determined by returns to unse-
cured creditors and company reorganiza-
tions."'? We analyzed "returns to" credi-
tors based on data regarding percentage 
of recoveries to unsecured creditors and 
"company reorganizations" based on 
whether debtors reorganized under a plan 
of reorganization or sold substantially all 
of their assets under either a liquidating 
plan or in a § 363 sale. 
As noted, approximately half of the 
cases in the database involved one or 
more statutory or ad hoc committees. 
The cases were further divided into 
three categories, as shown in chart 1: 
cases with no committees (NC cases), 
cases with one creditors' committee 
16 Id. (manuscript at 35). 
17 Id. 
Chart 1: Committee Structure (n=296) 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
• No Committee (NC) (n=144) 
• One Credi tors' Committee 
(UCC) (n=115) 
• Other Committee (OC) 
(n=37) 
Chart 2: Percentage of Cases (Confirmed Plans Only) with Resolution 
by Committee Type (Controlling for Assets and DIP Financing) 
86% 
UCC (n=75) NC (n=82) OC (n=32) 
- Reorgan ization - liquidation (including sa le fllotion) 
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(UCC cases) and cases with multiple 
or other committees (OC cases).lS The 
OC cases included cases with more 
than one type of creditors' committee 
or some combination of a creditors' 
committee, an equityholders' commit-
tee or an ad hoc committee. These cat-
egories were then used in some of our 
analyses to determine the impact of a 
creditors' committee's activities in a 
particular case. We also controlled for 
other potentially confounding variables, 
such as asset size, number of creditors, 
liabilities, secured creditors and debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing, to try to 
isolate the impact of creditors' commit-
tees on chapter 11 cases. 19 
As further explained in "Committee 
Capture" and shown in charts 2 and 3, 
"[c]ases with a single creditors' com-
mittee were significantly more likely 
than the other two categories to result in 
a plan of liquidation or a motion to sell 
substantially all of the debtor's assets .. . 
Those cases also were significantly more 
likely to provide distributions to unse-
18 Id. (manuscript at 23). The DC Cases category captures data for 
cases where no single committee was appointed to represent unse-
cured creditors. 
19 See id. (manuscript at 28-29). 
cured creditors in amounts less than or 
equal to 50 percent of their claim val-
ues.,,20 These effects persisted even after 
controlling for potentially confounding 
factors. Thus, the data tend to support 
rejecting the first hypothesis. 
With respect to the second hypoth-
esis, the data evidence showed actual 
and potential conflicts of interest among 
multiple committee members. Moreover, 
committees frequently are involved in 
litigated disputes with debtors or other 
creditors. Nevertheless, neither conflicts 
of interest nor litigation impacted value 
in the database cases.21 The data show no 
significant increase or decrease in returns 
to unsecured creditors or the likelihood 
of reorganization based on conflicts of 
interest or litigation. The data tends to 
support rejecting the second hypothesis. 
Although conflicts of interest and 
litigation do not appear to significantly 
impact value, they do tend to increase 
the costs associated with and duration of 
chapter 11 cases.22 The amount and types 
of disputes resulting in litigation also 
are striking. Committees tend not to file 
20 Id. (manuscript at 6). 
21 See id. (manuscript at 31-34). 
22 See id. (manuscript at 33-34). 
Chart 3: Percentage of Cases with Percentage Recovery to Unsecured Creditors 
by Committee Type (Controlling for Assets and DIP Financing) 
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Chart 4: How Does Conflict Between the Debtor and the UCC Regarding 
the Restructuring Plan Typically Impact Returns to Creditors? 
79% 77% 
- Committee Members (n=19) 
- Professiona ls (n=48) 
0% +---"--
Decreases returns No impact on retu rns Increases returns 
formal objections to fundamental trans-
actions in the case, such as DIP financ-
ing, motions to sell substantially all of 
the debtor's assets and confirmation of 
a plan of reorganization. However, they 
do frequently file or become actively 
involved in litigation with secured credi-
tors and debtors. For example, commit-
tees filed an objection or other pleading 
opposing conduct by secured creditors 
or debtors in 24 percent and 67 per-
cent, respectively, ofthe database cases 
involving creditors' committees.23 
In addition, creditors' committees are 
likely to retain at least one-and perhaps 
multiple-professionals in chapter 11 
cases. For example, committees in 135 
of the 143 cases (94.4 percent) with at 
least one creditors' committee retained 
at least one lawyer or law firm. Likewise, 
committees in 89 of the 143 cases (62.2 
percent) with at least one creditors' com-
mittee retained financial advisers.24 Of 
these cases, 98 (68.5 percent) involved 
multiple lawyers and financial advisers.25 
The retention of a financial adviser did 
not significantly impact the returns to 
unsecured creditors or the likelihood of 
the debtor reorganizing.26 
Analysis of Survey Data 
The professionals' and committee 
members' surveys drew responses from 
a variety of individuals with extensive 
collective experience in chapter 11 cases. 
The majority of respondents to the com-
mittee members' survey served on credi-
tors' committees, with a small percent-
age serving on equityholders' and ad 
hoc committees. Of these individuals, 
15 have served on more than 10 credi-
tors' committees and six have served on 
more than 10 ad hoc committees. The 
respondents to the professionals' survey 
were primarily divided among individu-
als representing debtors (35.7 percent), 
committees (17 .2 percent) and some 
combination of parties (31.4 percent) 
involved in chapter 11 cases.27 Of those 
individuals, approximately two-thirds 
(61.5 percent) reported working on more 
than 10 cases in any given year. 
The survey questions focused 
largely on how committees interact 
with other parties in chapter 11 cases 
23 See id. (manuscript at 32). 
24 Accordingly, 54 of these cases (37.8 percent) did not involve the reten-
tion of financiaf advisers. 
25 Specifically, of the 143 cases, eight have neither a financial adviser nor 
a lawyer, 37 have one lawyernaw firm and the remaining 98 have some 
combination of lawyers and/or financial advisers. 
26 The overwhelming majority of respondents (94.9 percent) were lawyers. 
Given the high percentage of cases appointing at least one law firm or 
lawyer for the committee, we did not have sufficient variability to ana-
lyze the impact of lawyers on value. 
27 In addition, 2.9 percent represent DIP lenders and 4.3 percent represent 
individual creditors in chapter 11 cases. 
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and consequently did not specifically 
address which was a more preferable 
structure: no committee, one creditors' 
committee or multiple committees. 
Nevertheless, both groups of respon-
dents suggest that disputes among the 
creditors' committee and the debtor 
or among the ad hoc committee and 
the debtor regarding the debtor's 
plan of reorganization generate addi-
tional value for unsecured creditors, 
as shown in chart 4.28 Likewise, both 
groups suggest that the involvement 
of one or more creditors trying to 
exert control over the chapter 11 case 
increases returns to unsecured credi-
tors.29 Although the case study did 
not observe any significant associa-
tion between conflicts or disputes and 
returns to creditors, the survey data 
lends support to the overarching notion 
that greater creditor participation in 
the chapter 11 case-i.e., dynamic ten-
sion-may enhance value. 30 
Moreover, both groups reported 
instances of conflict among committee 
members . The most frequently cited 
conflict involved disagreement over the 
debtor's plan of reorganization with at 
least one member being motivated by 
self interest. 31 The survey data sug-
gested that most of these conflicts are 
resolved informally, without the need 
for any formal pleading with or reso-
lution by the court. 32 In fact, the data 
showed that many committee objections 
to fundamental transactions are voiced 
in an informal manner and a majority 
of all committee objections are resolved 
without court intervention (see charts 5 
and 6 for other responses available to 
respondents) .33 This data may explain 
28 About 77 percent of professionals and 78 percent of committee mem-
bers indicated that conflict between the debtor and the creditors' 
committee regarding the restructuring plan typically results in increased 
returns to creditors. Nea~y 40 percent of professionals and 63 percent 
of committee members indicated that such conflict between the debtor 
and ad hoc committee typically results in increased returns to creditors. 
Respondents also could select that the conflict decreased or had no 
impact on retums to creditors. 
29 About 33 percent of professionals and 45 percent of committee mem-
bers indicated that the activities of individual creditors or small groups 
of creditors trying to assert influence in chapter 11 cases typically result 
in increased retums to creditors. Respondents also could select that 
such influence decreased or had no impact on returns to creditors. 
30 In addition to the limitations inherent in this type of survey study (e.g., 
self-selection bias), the difference between the survey study and case 
study data regarding conflicts of interest or disputes and value impact 
may relate to the off-docket nature of many conflicts of interest and 
disputes among parties in a chapter 11 case. See Harner and Marincic, 
supra, n.7 (manuscript at 31). The survey data confirms that many con-
flicts of interest and disputes are resolved without the filing of a formal 
pleading with or intervention by the bankruptcy court. 
31 Approximately 57 percent of professionals and 45 percent of committee 
members selected this option among six other options, including dis-
agreement over restructuring plan with no members motivated by self-
interest, disagreement over a significant event in the chapter 11 case 
with at least one member motivated by self-interest, disagreement over 
a significant event in the chapter 11 case with no members motivated 
by self-interest, disagreement over selection of professionals, other and 
not applicable. 
32 In the survey, 90 percent of professionals and 88 percent of committee 
members indicated that disputes among committee members are most 
commonly resolved in this way. 
the lack of formal committee objections 
to fundamental transactions recorded in 
the case database.34 
Preliminary Observations 
The rejection of the two primary 
hypotheses underlying the study raises 
interesting policy and doctrinal ques-
tions. We do not believe that the data 
suggest that creditors' committees are 
ineffective, but instead observes interest-
ing trends that suggest potential enhance-
ments to the use and composition of 
creditors' comrnittees.35 
For example, OC and NC cases per-
formed significantly better than VCC 
cases with respect to returns to credi-
tors and the likelihood of debtor reor-
ganization. An immediate and obvious 
response is to attribute the difference 
to factors such as the larger amount of 
33 Almost 32 percent of professionals and 23 percent of committee 
members indicated that objections raised by the creditors' committees 
are most commonly informal, with 95 percent of professionals and 76 
percent of committee members indicated that the majority of credi-
tors' committees' objections are resolved without court intervention. Of 
these, nearly 28 percent of professionals and 41 percent of committee 
members indicated that objections raised by the ad hoc committee are 
most commonly informal. Approximately 71 percent of professionals 
and 81 percent of committee members indicated that the majority of ad 
hoc committees' objections are resolved without court intervention. 
34 The key analyses underlying the case database component of the 
study do not rely on committee objections to fundamental transactions. 
Nevertheless, this off-docket information is an example of a limitation of 
observational studies. 
35 See Hamer and Marincic, supra, n.7 (manuscript at 35-41). 
assets and greater number of creditors 
typically involved in OC cases .36 That 
response turns out to be incorrect, given 
that the significance remained even after 
we controlled for those and other poten-
tially confounding factors. This suggests 
that something else is going on. 
One potential explanation is dynamic 
tension. In OC cases, more creditors are 
taking a more active role in the chapter 
11 process. Accordingly, rather than hav-
ing just one priority voiced to the debtor 
through a single creditors' committee, 
multiple parties voice potentially com-
peting priorities, which may cause all 
parties to evaluate valuations, restructur-
ing options and the like more closely.3? 
It also may suggest an underutilization 
of, or passivity by, creditors' commit-
tees when no other major constituency is 
organized or active in the case. 
We explore these and other potential 
explanations in "Committee Capture," 
and we hope to continue this evalua-
tion in our analysis of the survey data 
and future studies . Our ultimate goal is 
to help judges, practitioners and poli-
cymakers better understand the role of 
committees in chapter 11 and how they 
36 See id. app. B (manuscript at 44). 
37 See id. (manuscript at 35-41). 
Chart 5: Based on Past Experiences, Are the Most Common Objections 
Raised by the UCC Chapter 11 Cases Formal or Informal Objections? 
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might utilize the committee structure 
more effectively and efficiently going 
forward . As often suggested by courts 
and commentators, "the very nature of 
a chapter 11 case (the attempt to con-
tinue the debtor's business, generally 
the continuation of a DIP and the need 
to address both the determination of 
assets available for secured and unse-
cured creditors and equity security 
holders and the determination of the 
allocation of said assets among credi-
tors and equity security holders) dictates 
a much more active role for committees 
in chapter 11 cases."38 • 
Reprinted with permission from the ABI 
Journal, Vol. xxx, No.1, February 2011. 
The American Bankruptcy Institute is a 
multi-disciplinary, nonpartisan organization 
devoted to bankruptcy issues. ABI has 
more than 12,500 members, representing 
all facets of the insolvency field. For more 
information, visit ABI World at www. 
abiworld.org. 
38 In re Malin Motor Oillnc., 689 F.2d 445, 455 (3d Cir. 1982) (citatioo omitted). 
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